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IS THERE SCHOLARSHIP AFTER DEATH
OR
ARE EVIDENCE TEACHERS NEEDED AFTER THE FEDERAL
RULES?
JACK B. WEINSTEIN*
It is a great honor to be asked to address this distinguished com-
pany - the scholars responsible for cultivating a field I have, from
time to time over the past thirty years, worked in as a plowboy follow-
ing the directions of such brilliant evidentiary horticulturists as Thayer,
Wigmore, Morgan, Maguire, McCormick and Michael, to speak only
of some of the departed.' The question before us is whether there is
any further need for scholars and teachers of evidence since adoption
of the Federal Rules.
We all begin our careers in awe of our predecessors. I remember
when Dean Smith telephoned and asked me if I would join the Colum-
bia faculty. Surprised, I stuttered out a quick "yes," before he could
withdraw the offer. But I worried, "What can I possibly do? It's all
been done." That was not true then. And it is even less true now.
Every problem solved opens up new vistas for further study. Even ar-
eas constantly tilled sprout new hybrids requiring further attention.
During my first few years of teaching I had the entire set of Wig-
more behind my desk and at one time or another read through it fairly
completely, putting a yellow slip at each page where there was some-
thing that I did not understand and needed to reread. When I left Co-
lumbia, I think there was a yellow slip in almost every page, including
much of the index. It looked as if my Wigmore had grown a yellow
mold. Nor could this fungus of doubt be confined to its native habitat
in the library - it continues to blight my daily decisionmaking. Often
I wish one of you were on the bench so we could turn to each other and
* Adjunct Professor of Law, Columbia University; Chief Judge, United States District
Court, Eastern District of New York. Paper delivered at Association of American Law
Schools Workshop on the Teaching of Evidence, October 17, 1981. I am grateful for the
assistance of Guyora Binder, my law clerk.
1. Perhaps even these greats - doctrinal analysts all - might be seen as useful serfs
slowly and laboriously converting the wild thickets of the common law into more organized
gardens, while high above in their grand castles the social scientists and philosophers create
the new theories that may change the entire landscape of the law, the way we view it, and
what it does. See Posner, The Present Situation in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1113
(1981). But cf. Ackerman, The Marketplace ofIdeas, 90 YALE L.J. 1131 (1981) (comment on
Posner, suggesting that all of us are really serfs in the morning and squires in the afternoon).
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discuss the pros and cons - but, alas the trial judge is denied this lux-
ury of time and dialogue.
This troubling uncertainty is not mine alone. It is the ultimate fate
even of many of those who devote themselves to this field long enough
to become identified with its scholarly tradition. When I or others
would turn to McCormick for guidance, he would plead for time to
think about the question. Edward Cleary, in our sessions on the draft-
ing of federal rules of evidence, often had to admit that the law was
ambiguous - and that he had little sense of how to resolve the ambigu-
ity. We left not a few "misshapen" stones and "grotesque" structures
in the Federal Rules.2
No evidence scholar was a more courageous explorer than Mor-
gan. He searched deep in the recesses of the Harvard Law Library for
the antidote to the bite of that werewolf, Res Gestae. But even after
discovering that it was only garden-variety good sense, he would read-
ily have agreed that there were many strange growths still hidden in the
thickets of evidence. And some of you may recall that Maguire's
classes at Harvard were dubbed the Mystery Hours because of the con-
voluted nature of some of his accurate explanations. Only Wigmore
and perhaps Learned Hand were apparently absolutely sure of them-
selves, and not a few of their positions have been discredited by subse-
quent analysis and case law.3
This is not to suggest that we have not been doing our job. God
put authorities on earth to take positions that become out of joint with
changing times, and then he created young scholars to make the neces-
sary adjustments of theory to life. One of the greatest tools mankind
has developed for the performance of both duties is codification. Codi-
fication routinely requires at least two generations of scholarship - the
first to encode, the second to decode.
When, in the eleventh century, Moses Maimonides had the temer-
ity to codify Jewish oral law, his intention was to resolve the confusions
of his people once and for all. Yet, as we know, Maimonides initiated a
new cycle of codification and commentary in which perplexity and dis-
pute were probably even more common than they formerly had been.
2. See Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 486 (1948) (Writing prior to adoption
of the federal rules, Justice Jackson upheld the common law practice allowing inquiry into
specific instances of conduct on cross-examination of criminal defendant's character wit-
nesses, noting that the common law of evidence could not be rationalized piecemeal.) ("To
pull one misshapen stone out of the grotesque structure is more likely simply to upset its
present balance between adverse interests than to establish a rational edifice."); see also FED.
R. EVID. 405 & 608.
3. See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 464 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1972); United States v. Me-
ilo, 275 F. Supp. 314 (E.D.N.Y. 1967).
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Similarly, it is an oft-noted paradox that in continental countries,
where codes predominate, there is a large role for scholarly
interpretation.
In our own legal culture, the rise of legal scholarship as a profes-
sion coincided with the formalization of the law. Late in the nineteenth
century, Holmes still could say accurately that the life of the law had
been experience rather than logic.4 (Judge John Dooling of my court
regularly reminded us that Holmes might have been as widely quoted
had he said that a page of logic is worth a volume of experience.) Dur-
ing this era, Charles Langdell came to Harvard to initiate what Grant
Gilmore has called the Age of Faith.5 The traditional legal style of
reasoning - selecting, analyzing and reconciling cases, always with
one eye over one's shoulder on the practicalities of the matter - was
almost petrified into a method. The products of this new discipline
were published in the equally new student law journals as well as in a
proliferation of treatises and casebooks.
The sudden manufacture of an academic discipline out of whole
cloth was an amazing feat. It multiplied the need for law professors,
something for which we must all, in our most venal heart of hearts, be
grateful. The resultant royalties are sufficient to make all the authors
of our casebooks happy. But the creation of a new profession was only
half of Langdell's project. He wanted law to become not merely a dis-
cipline, but a science, and so consensus as to method was only a prel-
ude to consensus as to substance.
Individual efforts of the various treatise writers were brought to-
gether by the American Law Institute - and formalization then be-
came codification by partial consensus of the profession's elite.
Fortunately, these developments did not eliminate the need for fresh
legal scholarship. On the contrary, they increased it. Consensus was
very difficult to achieve, but very easy to imagine - and so codes were
drafted that papered over the contradictions and confficts within the
discipline.
This general pattern of development in our legal scholarship has
been exemplified by the field of evidence. Much of the law of evidence
developed on a case-by-case basis by fairly sophisticated and some-
times streetwise trial judges exercising their discretion and best judg-
ment of the moment. Then the appellate courts and the treatise writers
began to consolidate these cases into doctrine. On analysis much of
4. O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
5. G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 56 (1977). See also Simpson, The Rise
and Fall of the Legal Treatise: Legal Principles and the Forms of Legal Literature, 48 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 632, 666, 674-75, 677-79 (1981).
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this doctrine turned out to be somewhat silly. Thus began a critical
development beginning with Bentham and Stephen in England and
running through Thayer, Wigmore, Morgan, Cleary and others in this
country who sought to explain, simplify, criticise and reform.
At the same time an enormous mass of newer decisions required
analysis. Beginning most notably with Greenleaf in this country -
Wigmore's first edition constituted a revision of his volumes - there
was an attempt to winnow from the cases a meaningful analysis. Wig-
more and others succeeded in squeezing and twisting the cases into
what appeared to be a magnificent rational structure for determining
truth at trials. We are all grateful to James Harmon Chadbourn for
keeping Wigmore's treatise up to date and Professor Cleary and his
colleagues for keeping alive McCormick's great single volume.
The erection of this rational structure did not signal the end of
evidence teaching, else none of us would be here today. If anything, it
simplified our task as teachers because we could point out contradic-
tions and counterintuitive results against a background of coherence
and sense. By these means, we could present our inquiries as evidence
of critical intelligence rather than mere confusion. Eventually, the at-
tacks and emendations of the treatise and law review analysts became
so prevalent that they acquired more legitimacy than the structure they
had affixed themselves to.
The Field Evidence Code and other evidence codes of the last cen-
tury did not get very far, but in the twentieth century evidence codes
have fared better in this country. With the Commonwealth Fund re-
forms of the twenties, and then Morgan's ALI Code of Evidence, and
the 1954 Uniform Rules, codes began to exert increasing influence.
Two states - New Jersey and Kansas - adopted the Uniform Rules
with few changes. Others developed partial codes of their own, based
on existing doctrinal analyses and immediate needs such as those of
department stores for business entry exceptions and banks for the use
of phototstats. California drafted the most comprehensive code, based
in large part on Chadbourn's theoretical memoranda. More recently,
the Federal Rules have held sway. They have been adopted with varia-
tions in more than twenty jurisdictions.6 The acceptance of these re-
forms has provided a relatively simple and authoritative formulation of
the subject around which we can organize a course.
Some traditional analysis of developing case law continues to be
6. Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Maine, Michigan,
Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Puerto Rico, South Dakota, Washington, Wisconsin, Wyoming, and the United
States Military.
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required. Even in areas such as presumptions where scholars have
worked hard to cultivate a neat garden, courts sow such new weeds as
County Court v. Allen7 (a case cross-breeding the concept of "infer-
ence" with that of "presumption," to create the unpalatable hybrid,
"permissive presumption"), creating new clearing work for scholars.8
And occasionally a tornado of cases destroys an entire planting. As
one judge put it, "In the Chinese tradition, the legal aftermath of the
Supreme Court's ruling in Mullaney v. Wilbur [dealing with situations
when the burden of proof could not be placed on the defendant in a
criminal case] would have entitled this year . . . to the epithet, 'The
Year of Mullaney'. . .."
On the whole, however, codification has taken much of the spark
out of criticizing the old cases. Nevertheless, it has not succeeded in
ridding the world of the need for evidence scholarship.
This is in part because codification has created new puzzles of its
own. In drafting the Federal Rules of Evidence, Ed Cleary was clever
enough to deliberately include inconsistencies and exclude important
material - such as most of the subject of witness credibility. The re-
sult was to create a need for evidence teachers that will last through
many generations. At the time I did not fully appreciate his genius, but
it is now apparent to me that he was insuring the welfare of all of us
and of our children. I am convinced that he had the ability to draft a
perfect set of rules, manacled to Congress and the Advisory Committee
though he was, but that he chose not to do so. Such confficts of interest
are inevitable when codes are drafted by scholars with a teaching terri-
tory to protect. If we really wanted consistency in our codes, we would
have our first year students draft them. A group of real experts, if they
proceed with care, can be counted upon to construct a code that cannot
be traversed safely without the aid of skilled guides.
One consequence of a shift away from reliance on appellate deci-
sions, is a need for evidence scholars to develop new tools of analysis.
When a body of case law does not make sense, we can mumble a few
benedictions and make something up. If distinct lines of cases abso-
lutely cannot be tortured into submission, they can be overruled, or
better still, ignored. When a body of law is codified, however, we no
7. 442 U.S. 140 (1979).
8. See, e.g., Allen, More on Constitutional Process of Proof Problems in Criminal Cases,
94 HARV. L. REV. 1795 (1981); Allen, Structuring Jury Decision-Making in Criminal Cases: .4
Un#Fed ConstitutionalApproach to Evidentiary Devices, 94 HARV. L. REV. 321 (1980); Lush-
ing, Faces Without Features.- The Surface Validity of Criminal Inferences, 72 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 82 (1981).
9. Warren v. State, 29 Md. App. 560, 562, 350 A.2d 173, 176 (1976) (citation omitted).
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longer have these options - even though theoretically there is a contin-
uing supervising body to recommend change.'° We must confront the
problem of legislative design.
While the Federal Rules of Evidence are not statutory, they look
like statutes, and often they act like statutes. Unlike the rules of civil
procedure, the Federal Rules of Evidence bear the stamp of extensive
Congressional revision; rule 412, relevancy of victim's behavior in rape
cases, is a purely legislative enactment. The picture is further compli-
cated by the participation of the Advisory Committee and the Standing
Committee on the rules.
Constitutional scholars like Paul Brest and John Hart Ely often
have noted that legislative intent is a fiction.II In the case of the Fed-
eral Rules even the idea of a legislator is fictional. The history that
may be relevant to interpreting the Federal Rules includes: communi-
cations to, and internal discussions of, the Advisory and Standing
Committees of the Judicial Conference; hearings and marking sessions
of Congressional committees as well as debates on the floor among the
handful of legislators who had an interest in the draft; an occasional
dissenting memorandum from a member of the promulgating authority
- the Supreme Court; and the huge mass of material the rules were
designed to replace. 12
This amorphous data base gives modern evidence scholars the
kind of wide discretion they need to do interesting work. But it re-
quires the development of sophisticated and novel methods of
interpretation.
An example of the sort of interpretive effort that increasingly may
be attempted is Peter Tague's fine critique of rule 804(b)(3).1 Through
a painstaking examination of the sort of materials I have mentioned, he
comes to the conclusion that in drafting the penal interest exception,
the Judicial Committees and Congress yielded to pressure from a Sena-
tor and a Justice Department eager to maximize convictions. Tague
10. Perhaps it would be useful for the teachers of evidence as a body to press for neces-
sary updating of the rules as their individual and collective scholarship suggested areas
needing revision.
I1. Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204
(1980); Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legisla-
tive Motive, 1971 Sup. CT. REV. 95; Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Consti-
tutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970).
12. See, e.g., Weinstein, Preface to J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN's Evi-
DENCE at vii &passim (1980); J. WEINSTEIN, REFORM OF COURT RULE-MAKING PROCE-
DURES 71-75 (1977).
13. Tague, Perils of the Rulemaking Process: The Development, Application, and Uncon-
stitutionaliy of Rule 804(b) (3)'s Penal Interest Exception, 69 GEO. L.J. 851 (1981).
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sees this interpretation as the basis for a number of constitutional and
other infirmities in the rule.
An approach of this sort raises all of the epistemological problems
implicit in the diffusion of drafting responsibilities occasioned by the
rulemaking process. Should we infer from the Tague analysis that it
was the intent of the Supreme Court of the United States in promulgat-
ing rule 804(b)(3) to make convictions easier? In determining the in-
tent of Congress in modifying the rule, should we look merely at the
statements of the few representatives who took an active interest in the
revisions of the rules? The purposes of any one legislator or committee
member may be highly idiosyncratic but the language employed to im-
plement these purposes is often part of the common currency of legal
discourse. Should we look to the draftsperson's purpose in these in-
stances or the common meaning of the language in the context of de-
veloped practice?
Skepticism about "casual statements from floor debates," 4 are al-
ways in order, but when rules of evidence are involved sometimes even
remarks made in premeditated malice should receive little weight in a
subsequent complex courtroom setting. What flexibility, if any, is af-
forded by rules such as 102, directing that the rules be construed to
obtain justice and determine "truth," or 403, granting judges discretion
to limit prejudicial evidence, or 803(24) and 804(b)(5), the catchall
hearsay loopholes? Questions like these, raised by the very process of
codification through rulemaking, 15 promise to keep us busy for quite
some time.
The methodological challenges posed by codification are exacer-
bated by a concomitant development - the increasing reliance of fed-
eral courts of appeals on unpublished memoranda and summary
dispositions. 16 In the area of evidence, of course, most decisions are
made at the trial level and never appear in any written form. Usually,
they are recorded but not transcribed.
There has been a recent proliferation of opinions construing the
new rules. But, based on the appellate court memoranda I see, only a
small portion of appellate evidence rulings will be available to scholars.
I note that the Federal Rules of Evidence Reporter has taken to printing
14. Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 396 (1951) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
15. The entire rulemaking process needs reconsideration for this and other reasons. See,
e.g., J. WEINSTEIN, REFORM OF COURT RULE-MAKING PROCEDURES (1977).
16. See, Reynolds and Richman, An Evaluation of Limited Publication in the United
States Courts of Appeals." The Price ofReform, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 573 (1981).
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a few unpublished opinions. 7 But the Reporter misses most of them.
As a result it is very difficult to get a clear picture of how the rules are
being applied and interpreted in the courts. My own feeling is that this
may be just as well. Often evidentiary rulings on appeal are actually
substantive judgments dressed up in procedural clothing. Conse-
quently, even when they are published they have uncertain preceden-
tial value for the law of evidence and unsalted reliance on them by
scholars would be downright misleading.
I was struck by this problem in my correspondence with Paul Gi-
annelli, occasioned by his excellent article on novel scientific evidence.
In this article he espoused a restrictive burdens of proof approach' 8 to
replace the Frye doctrine, which limits new scientific proof to that rec-
ognized in the science community. I have expressed a preference for a
judicial discretionary approach derived from rule 403.19 In the course
of comparing our views, it became apparent to us both that neither of
us have much useful data on how discretion is actually being utilized.
Our arguments gasp for breath because they are made in the vacuum of
ignorance about the critical factor. How shall we get that data? Ques-
tionnaires do not work well. Observing trials or reading transcripts is
burdensome. Published opinions are not a fair sampling.
While nonpublication by judges may increase the value of aca-
demic scholarship, it probably lowers the integrity of judicial decision-
making. Partly this is because publication is an inherent check on
judicial caprice; but, in addition, present procedures probably make it
difficult even for the conscientious federal appellate judge to appreciate
fully the practice of his own court. The federal courts of appeals panels
change constantly, and without the gravitational pull of precedent, con-
sensus is hard to develop. When I make evidentiary rulings at trial, I
often know that particular panels would have conflicting responses on
17. See, e.g., Newhouse v. Robert's Ilima Tours, Inc., 8 FED. R. EVID. SERV. (CALLA-
GHAN) 1114 (9th Cir. 1981).
18. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientqc Evidence: Frye v. United States 4
Half Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1248 (1980) ("The prosecution in a criminal
case should be required to establish the validity of a novel scientific technique beyond a
reasonable doubt. Civil litigants and criminal defendants, on the other hand, should estab-
lish the validity of a novel technique by a preponderance of the evidence.").
19. I have advocated a balancing approach, weighing the probative value of the novel
scientific evidence against
such factors as the significance of the issue to which the evidence is directed, the availa-
bility of other proof, and the utility of limiting instructions. . . . [This] approach gives
courts a latitude which they do not possess under the general scientific acceptance rule
[because it] favors admissibility whenever the general conditions for the admissibility of
evidence have been met.
3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE 702[03] (1980).
[VOL. 41
SCHOLARSHIP AFTER DEATH
appeal. Doubtlessly, the judges on the courts of appeals know some-
thing of one anothers' leanings as well - but in the absence of re-
corded precedent, minority views live to fight again and even triumph,
on a differently constituted panel. The views of the various judges drift
through the docket like Anthony Amsterdam's pool hall scoring racks
- in parallel lines, notching a case here and there, never converging or
communicating.2 °
Thus, the rare occasion when an appellate evidentiary ruling is
considered and reported at length is often no cause for celebration.
Such opinions are potential criminals - of dubious parentage, unre-
strained by communal norms, and unpredictable. Armed and danger-
ous, they must be confined at all costs. For example, in United States v.
Oates,2 the Second Circuit made some elaborate interpretations of the
hearsay rules, suggesting that police reports not admissible under
803(8), the official records exception, could not be admitted under any
other hearsay exception. 22 The court thus held that the trial judge had
improperly admitted the report of a government chemist who was not
present to testify. His report concluded that the substance allegedly
taken from the defendant was heroin. There is some merit in the idea
- particularly in the context of the case at hand - that what is ex-
cluded under 803(8)(B) and (C), the qualification of the official records
exception relating to police reports, should not come back in under
803(6). Nevertheless, the dicta in Oates sweep much more broadly
than this, catching up much of the evidence traditionally accepted in
criminal prosecutions, including fingerprints.
In a subsequent case I attempted to obtain clarification. 23 The
case involved a fingerprint lifted from the wheel of a hijacked Brinks
truck. The defendant contended that the words "from wheel of truck"
were written, not at the time the prints were lifted, but much later, and
to perjurious purpose. Suspecting that the FBI would have received a'
copy of the prints before defense counsel contended that they had been
relabeled, I suggested that the prosecution call Washington. The next
morning, an FBI agent arrived with a stamped and dated photographic
20. Note, The Voidfor- Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67
(1960).
21. 560 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1977).
22. [I]n criminal cases reports of public agencies setting forth matters observed by
police officers and other law enforcement personnel and reports of public agencies
setting forth factual findings resulting from investigations made pursuant to au-
thority granted by law cannot satisfy the standards of any hearsay exception if
those reports are sought to be introduced against the accused.
Id. at 84.
23. United States v. Marino, No. 79-CR-367 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
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duplicate of the prints. Prior to Oates, the date stamped on this photo-
graph, though hearsay, probably would have been admissible at least
under rule 803(1), the contemporaneous statements exception, 803(5),
the recorded recollection exception, and 803(24),24 as well as under rule
803(6). But, since it was "[the] report of [a] public agency setting forth
matters observed by. . .law enforcement personnel," and it was intro-
duced against the accused in a criminal case, under Oates it "[could]
not satisfy the standards of any hearsay exception," despite its obvious
relevance and reliability.25 I invited the defense counsel to object,
finally putting the word "hearsay" in his mouth. At this point, I laid
out the issue and overruled the objection, in the hope that the Court of
Appeals, in reviewing the matter, would be induced to limit the Oates
case. I must admit to a certain amount of naivete on this point. I am
told that on argument, one of our most eminent judges said that he
could not see any hearsay issue; the memorandum decision rejected
defendant's argument out of hand; and in any case, the opinion was
never published.
I have no claim upon your sympathy in this matter - the law
journals are open to us, and I can make my views known. But most
judges do not write except in the form of opinions, and most contribu-
tors to the law reviews or treatises do not sit on the bench. We must
recognize that now, partially as a result of codification, there may be
less communication between the two groups.
If codification has not eliminated the need for evidence scholar-
ship, it has dramatically altered much of its function and direction. By
blocking traditional avenues of doctrinal analysis, codification has
forced the charting of previously unexplored routes. Had the Iberian
sailors of the Renaissance had free access to the eastern Mediterranean,
they might never have circumnavigated Africa or discovered America
when they did. For better or worse, the direct route to the spice-rich
East was preempted by Venice. Similarly, if we all could continue in-
24. Rule 803(24) is a general provision for exempting from the hearsay rule testimony
that is 1) accompanied by circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, 2) offered as evi-
dence of a material fact, 3) more probative on the point for which it is offered than any
other evidence which the proponent can provide through reasonable efforts, 4) admissible
consistent with the interests ofjustice. There is a fifth requirement of advance notice which
has been applied flexibly in cases like Marino, in which the need for the hearsay testimony is
not fully realized until after the trial begins, United States v. laconetti, 540 F.2d 574, 578 (2d
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977) ("[S]ome latitude [in giving notice] must be
permitted in situations like this in which the need does not become apparent until after the
trial has commenced. The fact that defendant did not request a continuance or in any way
claim that he was unable adequately to prepare to meet the rebuttal testimony further mili-
tates against a finding that he was prejudiced by it.").
25. See supra note 22.
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definitely in the almost perfectly engrossing pursuit of such matters as
purifying theories of hearsay, we would have no need to innovate. But
the law of hearsay, unfortunately, is already so refined that much hear-
say scholarship today is primarily heuristic in its aims - for example,
Roger Park's McCormick on Evidence and the Concept of Hearsay.- A
CriticalAnalysis Followed By Suggestions to Law Teachers,26 and Lau-
rence Tribe's Triangulating Hearsay.27
When the state of the law is ostensibly settled by codification, legal
scholars can no longer define their tasks in terms of the clarification of
the law. Widespread codification and restatement has turned the atten-
tion of teachers more towards the societal impact and the value of legal
institutions. Generally, in our discipline, these new interests have been
reflected in methodological borrowings from the social sciences and hu-
manities. The disciplines of economics and philosophy have become
particularly influential.28 Of course, social scientists and humanists are
probably no more sanguine about being discovered than were the na-
tives of the American and African continents. Nevertheless, the latter
discoveries greatly enriched Europe, and the former discoveries deepen
the study and practice of the law. Scholarship informed with norma-
tive and practical perspective can bring life to what has sometimes been
an arid theoretical exercise.
As evidence scholars, we have availed ourselves much more of the
secrets of the social sciences than of the humanities. Lawyers are seen
and see themselves as practical people, men and women of affairs.
Much of that reputation for practicality derives from our experience in
evaluating factual evidence about the social world.29 We are actuaries
and oddsmakers. Though we now treat probability as a creature of
mathematics, more and more evidence scholars are seeking to domesti-
cate it and bring it to heel.
Perhaps the single most controversial issue discussed by recent evi-
dence scholarship in the leading journals concerns the utility of mathe-
matical methods in assessing evidence. This controversy effectively
26. 65 MINN. L. REV. 423 (1981).
27. 87 HARV. L. REV. 957 (1974).
28. Economic theory informs much recent legal scholarship. See, e.g., R. POSNER, Eco-
NOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (1972); Symposium-Efficiency as a Legal Concern, 8 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 485 (1980); Symposium-Legal Scholarship: Its Nature and Plurpose, 90 YALE L.J. 955
(1981). Similarly, one can trace the influence of contemporary philosophers - for example,
John Rawls - in modem legal commentary. Compare J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE
(1971) with L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 10-1 (1978) and R. DWORKIN,
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY ch. 6 (1977).
29. As Michael Finkelstein recalls in the introduction to his study, QUANTITATIVE
METHODS IN LAW 2 (1978), Leibniz viewed lawyers as masters of the logic of probability in
the same way that mathematicians were experts on the logic of necessity.
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began in 1970, with the publication of Michael Finkelstein's and Wil-
liam Fairley's, A Bayesian Approach to Identification Evidence.3" It in-
spired Tribe's famous, rueful response - Trial by Mathematics.3 1
Tribe argued that the use of such devices exalted the prosecution's case
much more than it added to it substantively. Beyond this, he suggested,
the entire project might be a misapplication of probability theory.
Others, notably Daniel J. Kornstein,32 came to Fairley and Finkel-
stein's defense, while a third group consisting most prominently of the
British philosopher, L. Jonathan Cohen,3 3 and Lea Brilmayer and
Lewis Kornhauser34 took the view that probability theory could be
fairly employed in legal decisionmaking only if it were substantially
revised to reflect law's varying standards and burdens of proof. More
cautious proponents of Bayesian analysis, such as David Kaye, 35 have
defended the use of traditional probability theory in limited contexts.
Richard Lempert, among this group, has argued that probability theory
is useful, if not essential, in developing reasoned criteria of relevance.36
Still others, such as Elizabeth Loftus,37 have used the tools of mathe-
matical experimental psychology to test the veracity of eyewitness
identifications.
Statistical analysis of evidence is a burgeoning area of research,
and one which will inevitably find its way into a central position in our
evidence curriculum. When Lexis tells us how much more frequently
terms such as "standard deviation" and "multiple regression" appear in
the cases, their place in the reviews38 and in the classroom is clear.
At one time the role of statistical inference in litigation was con-
fined to such quaint problems as whether or not to hold a bus company
30. 83 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1970).
31. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics. Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L.
REV. 1329 (1971).
32. Kornstein, A Bayesian Model of Harmless Error, 5 J. LEGAL STUD. 121 (1976).
33. L. COHEN, THE PROBABLE AND THE PROVABLE (1977).
34. Brilmayer & Kornhauser, Review.- Quantitative Methods and Legal Decisions, 46 U.
Cll. L. REV. 116 (1978).
35. Kaye, Probability Theory Meets Res Ipsa Loquitur, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1456 (1979);
Kaye, The Laws of Probability and the Laws ofthe Land, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 34 (1979).
36. Lempert, Modeling Relevance, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1021 (1977).
37. E. LOFTUS, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY (1980). A survey of the literature in this area
may be found in Weinstein, Book Review, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 441 (1981).
38. See, e.g., Finkelstein, The Judicial Reception 0fMultiple Regression Studies in Race
and Sex Discrimination Cases, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 737 (1980); Fisher, Multille Regression in
Legal Proceedings, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 702 (1980). See also COMM. ON NAT'L STATISTICS
AND COMM. ON RESEARCH ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
ASSEMBLY OF BEHAVIORAL & SOCIAL SCIENCE, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, NAT'L ACAD-
EMY OF SCIENCES, PROPOSAL FOR A STUDY OF STATISTICAL ASSESSMENTS AS EVIDENCE IN
THE COURTS (1980) (multilithed).
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operating a line on a given street responsible for accidents there involv-
ing unidentified buses. 39 Today, however, the crucial evidence in much
of our most important litigation is explicitly probabilistic. In areas of
public concern ranging from race discrimination to the carcinogenic
effects of pollutants and other toxins, litigation is synonomous with sta-
tistical evaluation. In cases of this sort, complex procedural issues such
as the joinder of parties through class actions and multi-district litiga-
tion intersect with fundamental problems of evidence theory.
This increasing role for statistical assessment of evidence results
not from any attempt on the part of scholars to formalize a jury's evalu-
ation of circumstantial evidence, but from an increasing commitment
throughout our legal system to holding individuals and institutions re-
sponsible for the long-range and indirect effects of their actions. It is
this more sophisticated understanding of our society now animating the
administration of justice' ° that requires a more sophisticated process of
judicial and jury decisionmaking. But even in the simpler and more
traditional forms of litigation basic studies on how people reason and
how they may be trained to evaluate evidence more accurately require
us to consider mathematical and other models of the real world more
seriously than we have in the past.4
While we have developed a good deal of theoretical and practical
knowledge about how people individually and in small groups think,
there is much to be done in gaining a better understanding of decision-
making in and outside the courtroom. Even the effect on fact finding of
the individual knowledge and background of the trier - whether judge
or jury - is still a mystery which has not been dispelled by lawyers'
increasing use of social psychologists in picking juries.
Evidence pedagogy in general is becoming more sensitive to the
practical nuances of applying the law. This is, of course, part of a
larger picture in which clinical education is on the rise. But concurrent
with this has been a new phenomenon in classroom teaching - the
advent of the problem method, in which students test rules of law they
are asked to apply in situations simulating those they might face as
lawyers - an extension of our traditional use of hypotheticals. It is to
be regretted that the time devoted to clinical and problem methods may
39. See, e.g., Smith v. Rapid Transit, Inc., 317 Mass. 469, 58 N.E.2d 754 (1945); see also
Kaye, The Paradox ofthe Gatecrasher and Other Stories, 1979 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 101.
40. See Fiss, The Supreme Court 1978 Term-Foreword" The Forms ofJustice, 93 HARV.
L. REV. 1 (1979).
41. See, e.g., R. NISBETr & L. Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE (1980); Saks & Kidd, Human
Information Processing and Adudication: Trial by Heuristics, 15 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 123
(1980-81); Tversky & Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and
Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 207 (1973).
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diminish the amount of time that can be devoted to theoretical instruc-
tion; but these teaching methods are particularly useful in teaching
fields of law which are codified. One study comparing the problem
method with the case method and computer techniques in teaching evi-
dence found that the problem method produced (in slight degree) the
highest scores in comprehension in the least amount of overall study
time.42
Problem instruction can be effective not only where the law is fixed
and fairly specific, but where it barely exists at all. Today house coun-
sel are often confronted with such questions as whether a new product
creates an environmental or other hazard. In this and in other contexts,
lawyers increasingly are acting as factfinders outside the courtroom.
Students can consult neither the casebook nor the rulebook for gui-
dance about such situations.43 They can only consult their own experi-
ence and fundamental theory on factfinding and decisionmaking. As a
result, it may be useful to expose students to a setting in which they will
develop and evaluate evidence in interaction with a client or witness or
in response to raw data.
Whether teaching by computers, clinical or written problems,
cases, or a combination, most teachers will, I think, continue to stress
theory. That is what the best evidence teachers have done and what
their students have probably found has the most carryover value into
later years at the bar, Nevertheless, perhaps in post-graduate teaching
of practitioners, problems and practical content rather than theory
should be emphasized.
TV cassettes and films as well as computer teaching may permit
teachers to achieve what a few feel is the optimal academic life -
teaching without the need to talk to students. I rather doubt that this is
true of many law school teachers of evidence.
Emphasis on clinics and non-courtroom settings increasingly re-
quires us to import ethical issues into the subject of evidence. In inter-
viewing a client, is an attorney really finding out what a client wants?
What a witness really saw? Is he imposing his own perceptions? These
questions are particuarly important in light of findings by William Si-
mon 45 and Jack Himmelstein46 that lawyers sometimes impose their
42. Kimball & Farmer, Comparative Results of Teaching Evidence Three Ways, 30 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 196 (1979).
43. See, e.g., CENTER FOR PUB. RESOURCES, DISPUTE MANAGEMENT (1981).
44. Weinstein, Introduction to E. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF STATE AND FEDERAL
EVIDENCE at ix (5th ed. J. Weinstein 1976).
45. Simon, The Ideology ofAdvocacy" Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978
WIS. L. REV. 29.
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own preconceptions on litigants. In instances where lawyers cut their
clients to fit the suit, they are perhaps as much victims of socializing
pressures as the clients are. But in instances where lawyers act outside
of the court system as informal dispute settlers, they may have a greater
obligation to step outside their own preconceptions.
In general we are witnessing a convergence between the fields of
evidence and legal ethics. The intersection is clearest in the area of
attorney-client privilege.47 Can privileges even be taught in the evi-
dence course which has contracted from six to four to three points? Or
are they too important for us, and should they be parceled out among
the new courses in Professional Responsibility, or the ones in Constitu-
tional Law, Corporations, Criminal Procedure and Family Law? Since
they present some of the most stimulating areas of law, I would hate to
see Privileges escape from our preserve.
Questions of privilege are cropping up in so many areas that they
now seem fundamental to any meaningful concept of the field of evi-
dence. The ABA's Kutak Committee proposals4" and widespread criti-
cism and counterproposals,49 raise issues central to our concept of the
adversarial system. Their resolution will have an important, perhaps a
profound, impact on our approach to trials and rules of evidence.50
Here, the economists, sociologists and philosophers may be critical.
Our adversarial techniques for resolving disputes are not sacrosanct.
46. Himmelstein, Reassessing Law Schooling: An Inquiry Into the Application of Human-
istic Educational Psychology to the Teaching of Law, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 514 (1978).
47. See, e.g., Upjohn Company v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981) on the scope of the
attorney's work product and of the attorney-client privilege in the context of inquiries by the
Internal Revenue Service.
48. See Kutak, Model Rules of Professional Conduct: Ethical Standardsfor the '80s and
Beyond, 67 A.B.A. J. 116 (1981). The draft rules emphasize attorneys' ethical obligations to
their clients, id. at 1117, but stress that "[a] lawyer may do for a client only what the client
could lawfully do if possessed of similar skills." Id. at 1119 (emphasis added). They man-
date disclosure of client misconduct whenever disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a
criminal or fraudulent act, and also authorize disclosure if the act threatens substantial
harm. Id. at 1119-20.
49. See, e.g., THE AMERICAN LAWYER'S CODE OF CONDUCT (Commission on Profes-
sional Responsibility of the Roscoe Pound-American Trial Lawyers Foundation) (Discus-
sion Draft 1980), reprinted in TRIAL, Aug. 1980, at 44. The basic thurst of this code is that
the lawyer has an overriding responsibility to represent his client as best he can. The code
permits disclosure of client misconduct only in very limited circumstances.
50. A recent New York State Supreme Court decision, People v. Salquerro, 107 Misc. 2d
155, 433 N.Y.S.2d 711 (Sup. Ct. 1980) held that attorneys were obligated to reveal to the
court knowledge of their client's intent to perjure themselves and were precluded from re-
cusing themselves thereafter. The Yale Law Journal recently proposed that the Code of
Ethics be amended to condemn the participation or acquiescence of an attorney in the de-
struction of evidence detrimental to his client's interest - something I never thought any
lawyer could think either ethical or tactically sound. Note, Legal Ethics and the Destruction
of Evidence, 80 YALE L.J. 1665 (1980).
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The benefits may not be worth the social costs, given possible
alternatives.
Examples of conflict between the attorney-client privilege and the
interests of justice are part of the larger conflict between, on the one
hand, professional or personal ethics and, on the other, the integrity of
a fact-finding process and the substantive needs of the public. We are
all familiar with the California case in which a psychiatrist was held
civilly liable for violating his duty to warn the acquaintance of a pa-
tient that her life was in danger."' There are a myriad of relationships
in society - genetic, domestic, professional, journalistic, religious -
generating analogous privacy interests. There are also a myriad of fact-
finding processes - judicial, administrative, legislative, even scientific
- on the success and integrity of which great interests depend.
It is increasingly clear that this fundamental conflict between pri-
vacy and inquiry52 binds evidence inexorably not merely to legal ethics,
but to ethics itself. And that means that the current generation of
scholars have before them a group of problems that will take more than
one generation to solve.
In short, we may paraphrase Malthus by concluding that the hun-
ger for evidence scholarship grows faster than scholarly production.
We must not only till and retill the old fields more intensively. We
must develop whole new genetic strains of dispute resolution and eth-
ics, fertilized by new needs and policies and research techniques. We
must clear new fields in the eternal search for the truth, and develop
new methods of cultivating future harvests of better lawyers, judges
and teachers.
In the course of tending the garden we have been bequeathed,
however, we should recall that our purpose is not merely to grow fruit,
but to enjoy it. As a much beloved teacher of evidence, the late Arthur
Leff, reminded us shortly before his untimely death, not the least rea-
son for pursuing a life of scholarship is, and should be, that it's fun. 3
51. Tarasoffv. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr.
14 (1976).
52. See, e.g., the debate between Hill, Testimonial Pripilege and Fair Trial, 80 COLUM. L.
REV. 1173 (1980) and Westen, Refections on Afred Hill's "Testimonial Privilege and Fair
Trial", 14 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 371 (1981). See also Lora v. Bd. of Educ., 74 F.R.D. 565
(E.D.N.Y. 1977).
53. Leff, Afterword to Symposium, Legal Scholarshp. Its Nature and Purpose, 90 YALE
L.J. 1296 (1981). Professor Lefts last words on the subject were: "But to have crafted, on
occasion, something true and truly put - whatever the devil else legal scholarship is, is
from, or is for, it's the joy of that too." Id. at 1296.
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